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The European Union (EU) is at a critical juncture that will either trigger further integration or reinforce a mode
of intergovernmental cooperation. The spread of market pressure to a growing number of states demonstrates that
the crisis needs to be dealt with at the European and not just the national level. Up to now the ‘politics of extreme
austerity’ has been the mainstream recipe promoted to and adopted by member states. The measures are tougher
in those countries where there has been external financial assistance (i.e. Greece, Portugal and Ireland) but the rest
of Europe is following suit (e.g. Italy and the UK). This introduction outlines the key directions of EU reforms
to put into context the more specific cases discussed elsewhere in this symposium. The strengths and weaknesses
of the theoretical frameworks employed in the articles are discussed to demonstrate the lessons that the crisis offers
for our well-established public policy models and to highlight avenues for further research. Two main arguments
are advanced: first, the crisis calls for an interdisciplinary approach to comprehend its full extent and deal with it
efficiently; and second, the current political trajectory of the EU calls for urgent changes to strengthen its cohesion
and long-term viability.
Keywords: EU; austerity politics; Eurozone crisis; governance
On the eve of the financial crisis in 2008, the European Union and its most prized
achievement – the euro – appeared safe. The Commission described the euro as a
‘resounding success’ (European Commission, 2008, p. 3) and there was little indication
that the Eurozone would soon be battling for its credibility and, indeed, survival.
Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, however, EU member states have been
confronted with a series of hard policy dilemmas. To save individual banks and thus the
banking system from collapse, a series of financial commitments, guarantees and bailout
packages were agreed that led to massive increases in budget deficits and debt levels. In
combination with sluggish growth and growing unemployment rates, the EU and the
Eurozone in particular have resorted to initially short-term crisis management techniques
and often desperate attempts to reassure the markets about the viability of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU).
The banking and financial crisis thus mutated into a debt crisis, and since 2010 to a
full-blown economic crisis with far-reaching political, economic and social repercussions.
The European Union is now trying to perform several roles simultaneously: provide
assistance to countries in need of financial aid; reinforce conditionality by building on the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) by adding new institutional features; and enhance
integration by formulating new policies and inventing new institutional mechanisms.
It is the latter part of the EU’s work that concerns us here. Since the onset of the
crisis, Europe has proceeded with the creation of new institutional mechanisms to
contain and/or mitigate the effects of the crisis. Some of the new policy instruments
agreed upon or currently debated will, however, have long-lasting consequences that
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affect the very nature of the EU project as they imply a shift in the balance between
national and EU competences and stronger EU surveillance powers over member state
policies. More importantly, these initiatives reveal the political balance of power in the
EU as well as the preferred political and economic direction of the EU in years to come.
This policy direction is of paramount significance despite the lack of attention paid to it
in the context of successive ‘crisis summits’, the ongoing speculation over a possible
Greek exit from the Eurozone and the clouds of uncertainty that hang over the EU as
a whole.
The depth of the Eurozone crisis and the efforts to contain it not only inform a series
of political choices, but also force us to rethink our theoretical approaches to integration
and to public policy change. Long-held convictions and much-discussed paradigms and
approaches are now called into question, and the effects of the crisis make it all the more
urgent to learn lessons in the wake of important shifts in EU thinking. In this article, we
discuss the theoretical frameworks presented in the symposium’s other contributions from
a critical perspective in order to draw lessons from their application, as well as to
highlight avenues for further research and their policy implications.
We begin with an outline of the institutional reforms and changes agreed or set in
motion since 2008. We then link the theoretical approaches discussed elsewhere in this
symposium with the institutional and political reforms introduced at European and
member state levels, trying to derive useful public policy lessons. In the final part we
analyse the salience of these changes with regard to the future of the EU and discuss its
future political trajectory.
A New EU Governance Architecture: Policy Reform since 2009
The onset of the crisis found the member states unprepared to deal with it. Today it is
easily forgotten that back in 2008–9 few people foresaw the depth of the crisis and the
extraordinary amount of money, resources and EU Council summits that would be
required to bail out financial institutions. One recent estimate suggests that member states
have provided state aid to financial institutions in the range of €4.5 trillion, which
represents 37 per cent of EU gross domestic product (GDP) (Degryse, 2012, p. 79).
Averting a collapse of precious financial institutions meant that the EU, and the
Eurozone in particular, found themselves caught in a debt and deficit trap from which they
have yet to emerge. However, little attention has been paid (by the EU institutions as much
as by analysts and commentators) to the fact that prior to the crisis the vast majority of EU
member states were performing very positively with regard to both their debt and deficit
levels. With the exception of Greece – a country whose economic management skills left
a lot to be desired over decades (Tsarouhas, 2012) – other members were able to achieve
consistent budget surpluses in the period 1999–2007. This includes Spain and Ireland, both
of which have subsequently received financial assistance from the EU. The overall picture
for the EU-27 is unambiguous: in 2007 the EU-27 debt and deficit levels amounted to 0.9
and 59 per cent, respectively – comfortably within the margins determined by the
Maastricht Criteria and the SGP (Degryse, 2012, pp. 69–70). Successive bailouts and
stimulus packages to avoid an economic Armageddon led to a rapid increase in these
indices and a frantic, often chaotic attempt by EU institutions to contain the crisis.
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Over the last four years the EU has created a host of new policy instruments, both
formal and informal. More importantly, central institutions such as the European Com-
mission, the European Council and the European Central Bank (ECB) have, in the
course of this process, acquired new, substantial powers of surveillance and potential
sanctioning over member states. Furthermore, these new surveillance and sanctioning
powers are accompanied by the imposition (for bailout states) or ‘strong encouragement’
(for everyone else) to proceed with public policy reforms, particularly in the sphere of
social and labour market policy. Finally, all of this has occurred in the context of
austerity, which has been consistently exercised by member states since 2010 and has
greatly contributed to the current economic and unemployment crisis in most EU
member states.
Ironically, perhaps, the early phase of the crisis proved to be a Keynesian moment. In
2008 state after state chose to partly nationalise financial institutions (UK), unleash rescue
plans (France, Germany) or offer special funding to the financial system (Spain)
(Degryse, 2012, p. 19). For a brief moment, the discrediting of the existing economic
consensus opened new avenues of thinking with regard to financial market regulation
and state intervention. Yet by late 2009/early 2010 the Eurozone economies were
subjected to consecutive downgrading of their debt by the world’s three largest rating
agencies. What followed was a series of crisis summits and policy initiatives to contain
the growing fire.
First, in 2010 a new unofficial institution was created. The ‘Euro Summit’ brings
together the heads of state and government of Eurozone members. Speculation over the
creation of a Eurozone budget (Gros, 2012) reinforces the salience of this unofficial body
whose existence is not laid out in any EU treaty. Second, the EU has created three new
financial assistance mechanisms that have rearranged the surveillance and supervision
mechanisms of different institutions. The assistance mechanisms are the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Despite their differences, all three bodies
build on the Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA) that helped support non-
Eurozone states with balance-of-payments difficulties. All three instruments are modelled
on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the EFSF and ESM in particular linked
to financial conditionality. Moreover, their creation means that the Commission is now
a major player in the process of activating and implementing financial assistance as it is
mandated to negotiate the macroeconomic adjustment programme of states and monitor
compliance with it (Salines et al., 2012, pp. 675–7). Third, the EU has sought to
reinforce economic governance, reform the SGP and institutionalise the ‘golden rule’ of
balanced budgets. The most important instruments to achieve these aims are: (1) the
six-pack of five Regulations and one Directive along with the European Semester, which
intensify macroeconomic surveillance over member states; (2) the Euro Plus Pact, which
reinforces economic policy coordination and imposes stricter fiscal discipline on member
states; and (3) the Fiscal Compact, which obliges states to insert into their legal bodies
and/or constitutions the rule of balanced budgets. All of these institutional changes have
occurred in the context of austerity policy and have been observed in the EU almost
without exception since 2010.
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Overall, these reforms point to a changing landscape in EU governance. The Com-
mission and (to some extent) the ECB are now tasked with the supervision, monitoring
and implementation of macroeconomic adjustment programmes, including the revision
of budgetary plans by member states deemed to be in breach of the golden rule.
Furthermore, the EU will now oversee public policy reforms, particularly in the fields of
pensions, healthcare, industrial relations law and public administration. Although member
states are still in charge of reform, the content of the reforms have to be compatible with
the priorities set out by the Council and the Commission in the reinforced economic
governance package, including the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), which is part of the
European Semester.
In the context of the empirical record discussed above, we now turn to the theoretical
lessons we need to learn in order to understand the crisis, and we link these to the rest
of the contributions in this symposium.
Rethinking Theory
One of the key aims of this symposium is to reconsider the theoretical tools available for
understanding political and policy responses to the Eurozone crisis. Current EU devel-
opments, as well as national reactions discussed elsewhere in the symposium, force us to
revive and redesign classic theories such as corporatism (see Jordana, 2014), but also to
rethink and advance more recent approaches such as Europeanisation (see Saurugger,
2014). A crucial point to be made is that interdisciplinary research and the exchange of
approaches, data and results across the social sciences is a sine qua non given the increasing
complexity of crises. The articles in this symposium draw upon the disciplines of politics,
public policy analysis, economics, sociology, international relations, international political
economy and EU studies, showing that it is exactly this plurality that can lead to
theoretical innovation and the generation of valuable empirical data.
The first article, by Sabine Saurugger, provides a valuable starting point in that it sets
out the conceptual basis upon which to study the case studies outlined elsewhere. The
article concerns the study of Europeanisation and of the EU polity in light of the current
crisis. Saurugger convincingly claims that the resistance of EU member states to austerity
measures and other policy reforms that have been imposed – arguably as a response to the
crisis – shows that Europeanisation is not simply a top-down process. More focus should
be placed on circular Europeanisation (top-down, but also bottom-up), which is
acknowledged theoretically but often neglected empirically. Such a focus, which builds
upon existing research on time and discourse, will allow for a deeper understanding of
the significance of the political aspects of Europeanisation. Her argument is compatible
with similar attempts to explore the changing face of the relationship between the EU
and its member states. New additions to the literature already engage with terms such as
‘coercive’ or ‘fast-forward’ Europeanisation, which is characterised by an intensification
of hard mechanisms of Europeanisation (Ladi, 2014; Ladi and Graziano, 2014). Given
the political conundrum existing in most member states, an increase in hard mechanisms
would unavoidably augment resistance at the national level and therefore lead the EU
polity into a vicious circle of decreasing trust – a process that has already begun in a
number of EU states.
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The need for interdisciplinary research in order to gain an in-depth understanding of
the crisis and its consequences and also in order to inform policy making is highlighted
in the next article by Antigone Lyberaki and Platon Tinios (2014). Their analysis focuses
on the impact that the financial crisis and the subsequent austerity policy response have
had on both the formal and the informal welfare state in Greece. Theoretically, this is a
very interesting endeavour because it draws attention to already existing tools and the
way they ought to be developed in order to understand policy failure. Specifically, this
contribution reminds us that the study of social networks and more particularly social
capital needs to be combined with the study of public finance. Lyberaki and Tinios show
how a policy measure such as a tax increase squeezes the informal welfare state by putting
pressure on the family budget and its ability to offer care for the elderly, children and
other vulnerable groups. Consequently, the demand for funds derived from the formal
welfare state increases. Combining economic analysis with social networks theory pro-
vides invaluable information on transaction costs (Davern, 1997). Such information can
enlighten the study of policy failure and success and also be of practical use to policy
makers in their attempt to contain the consequences of the economic crisis on those parts
of the population most affected.
A different but equally significant issue that has arisen due to the urgency of the
financial crisis is the availability of reliable data in order to understand social trends and
hence inform policy making. In their article, Manos Matsaganis and Chrysa Leventi
(2014) demonstrate the effectiveness of the microsimulation approach in measuring
poverty and social inequality at an early stage. Their study concentrates on the impact of
the crisis and of austerity policies upon poverty and social inequality in Greece. They
find a dramatic rise in poverty rates and a less pronounced but still significant increase in
inequality rates. Methodologically, it is important to note the novelty of microsimulation,
which can provide results similar to more classical surveys based on simulation of tax and
benefits data (Figari et al., 2012). The importance of an interdisciplinary approach is once
again demonstrated here. If economic analysis can speed up the provision of reliable data
on key social indicators such as poverty and inequality, then public policy analysis can
also follow with more accurate explanations of the immediate outcomes of policy
reforms as well as with feasible alternatives to extreme austerity measures in dealing with
the crisis.
The final article of this symposium alerts us to the topicality of corporatist theory.
Jacint Jordana (2014) describes public policy change in Spain as policy dismantling, and
highlights that policies that do not have corporatist coalitions to defend them have
proven to be the most fragile and thus open to intrusive change (e.g. child policy and
active labour market policy). Jordana demonstrates that corporate coalitions such as elite
professional public servants and the local financial community have managed to diminish
the damage of budget cuts in their sectors in comparison to less privileged groups.
He contends that this is because of the lack of regulation and consequent more
long-term change in these sectors. His comparison of Spain’s current structural problems
with problems that the country faced before its entry into the Eurozone perfectly fits
Carlos Molina and Martin Rhodes’ (2002) analysis on the past, present and future of
corporatism. Molina and Rhodes argue that corporatism needs to be studied and under-
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stood more as a system of policy making than as a structure of interest representation. To
simply assume the end of corporatism because of globalisation, the EMU or indeed the
current pressures being faced by European states limits our understanding of winners and
losers in the ongoing wave of public policy reforms. Jordana’s article offers an entry point
into the incorporation of corporatist relations in their more flexible (e.g. networks) rather
than formal (e.g. tripartite bargaining) format in explaining change.
Rethinking Practice: The Future of the EU
The financial crisis provides fertile ground for reconsidering existing theoretical schemes
for analysing the crisis. It points to the limitations of an inadequate cross-fertilisation
between disciplines, and exposes the fallacy of nationally driven methodological
approaches in the face of systemic failures at the heart of the EU project. Yet it is clear
that the empirical, everyday aspect of the crisis deserves equal attention – not least
because this is a crisis unlike previous ones. Having started as a failure of regulation, it
has mutated into a banking, then economic and ultimately a political crisis. The latter
aspect of the crisis is the most lethal one, and failing to deal with it appropriately may
come to signify the beginning of the end of the EU project. Rising levels of
Euroscepticism across much of the EU testify to the fragility of the current political
settlement and call for new responses in the wake of popular dissatisfaction with the EU’s
course of action to date. In this context then, what is the normative framework of
reform that the EU ought to strive for, and what are the prospects for realising such
reforms?
As outlined in the first section, the EU has taken steps towards closer policy coordi-
nation, including the establishment of a form of banking union, to deal with such crises
better the next time they appear. In October 2013, a Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) comprising the ECB and member states’ supervisory authorities was agreed. Two
months later and in addition to a single resolution fund for banks, a Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM) has also been proposed by the Commission. The ‘general approach’
therein was accepted by the Council in December 2013 although this was the result of
a compromise that explicitly mentions the need for an intergovernmental agreement on
the functioning of the single resolution fund (Council of the European Union, 2013).
Negotiations with the European Parliament are the next step. Moreover, new surveil-
lance mechanisms have been introduced and the ability of member states to avoid
compliance has been drastically curtailed (Tsoukalis, 2012). In the short run, the
Eurozone has survived and the EU continues to muddle through.
There are, however, two fundamental problems that have important empirical as well
as theoretical implications. They are linked and their solution is a sine qua non for the
future of the EU. The first and most immediate problem relates to the lack of consensus
on the political measures needed to lift the EU out of the crisis or to provide the stability
and political space necessary to debate the future of integration in earnest and in good
faith. This is a problem that has remained unaddressed since the crisis began – not least
because the lack of consensus exists both between and within member states. In country
after country, the ballot box returns politicians deeply critical of the austerity course
chosen since the crisis began. Moreover, many of those rejecting austerity go a step
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further and call into question the EU itself. This is the latest warning to the EU that
politics as usual will no longer do. That may have worked in the past, but muddling
through and expecting the storm to go away will not be sufficient this time. Most
worrying of all is the failure to recognise this tendency or to debate it in the open. A
technocratic approach has been the default option till now, leading to further estrange-
ment between the governing and the governed at EU level (Overbeek, 2012, pp. 44–5).
The second problem is the paradoxical phenomenon of top-down Europeanisa-
tion and the centralised coordination of policies, alongside a clear turn towards inter-
governmentalism in the decision-making process. The compromise reached in the
Council on the single resolution fund is a perfect example of the continuous wish by
some member states to proceed with EU reform along intergovernmentalist lines. Nego-
tiations with the European Parliament (EP) on reaching a mutually acceptable solution
will be tough, as stated by the EP President. A particularly thorny aspect of these
negotiations could be the fact that the fund responsible for bank closures now appears
beyond the scope of the EP’s handling power (O’Donnell, 2014).
This complicates the future of the EU – not least because it allows for the old problem
of the ‘democratic deficit’ to resurface, only in even sharper form. Moreover, previous
decisions outlined in the first section have also been an almost exclusively inter-
govermental affair, with Germany providing most of the input and design (seconded by
other member states whenever necessary). The new policy measures have been imposed
on member states, their electorates and parliaments. The latter have every right to feel
powerless in the face of policies designed for the ‘collective good’, and yet they are
formally in control of the integration process as their consent is necessary on all major
decisions – not least with regard to the release of financial support to bailed-out states.
The existence of this paradox only serves to reinforce the disillusionment and rejection
of the EU, which is particularly acute in Southern Europe though not limited to it.
So what is to be done? The two problems are intertwined, and the solution of the one
feeds into the other. The good news is that a degree of politicisation and a step back from
the politics of technocracy is near inevitable if the EU is to confront the challenges of
these problems effectively. A good starting point would be to reconsider the politics of
extreme austerity and develop policy tools that go beyond the institutional setup to
promote growth and employment. As the articles in this symposium demonstrate, the
current policy course of extreme austerity has had dramatic distributional and economic
circumstances, especially in Southern Europe (Overbeek, 2012, p. 42). This has led to
social dislocation in countries such as Greece and Spain, and has reinforced extremist
politics at the expense of both the national political class and the EU more generally.
Considering that Southern European states have traditionally supported closer political
integration, the ineffectiveness of extreme austerity manifests itself both economically
and politically. What is more, the new institutional architecture outlined in the first
section comes to strengthen the limits inherent in the original Maastricht settlement,
which focused exclusively on market-based adjustment and conceptualised convergence
in an overtly economic sense (Aiginger et al., 2012).
An alternative does exist, however, and comes in the form of a set of measures to lift
Europe out of the crisis. Plans for a banking union (despite the manifest difficulties in
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setting it up) are a start, but they do not go far enough. The EU ought to rethink how
to integrate the ambitious Europe 2020 agenda into the new governance architecture and
make its laudable targets on employment, poverty reduction and social cohesion a
mandatory part of convergence. To that end, the idea of a mandatory social pact as
promoted by European non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is a good point of
departure (European Commission, 2010; Social Platform, 2013). Moreover, some form
of debt mutualisation, carefully crafted and entailing safety clauses to avoid free-riding
and moral hazard problems, can and should be introduced. In fact, such a proposal was
formulated a long time ago but has yet to be implemented. Finally, to avoid the danger
of permanent deflation, particularly in Southern Europe, the EU should mobilise all
available instruments from the ECB, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
European Social Fund (ESF) to promote sustainable growth that will lead to employment
and welfare. Unfortunately, the budget agreed for the next seven-year Multiannual
Financial Framework falls way short of such an approach, despite the fact that unem-
ployment continues to climb. A different course of political action is both possible and
necessary.
Nevertheless, these proposals will hardly be enough on their own or as long as an aloof
form of intergovernmentalism is practised. Instead, it is now time to strengthen the
Community method and take a step back from unilateral policy initiatives that are then
dressed up in communitarian language. The EU will be not only tolerated but also
actively supported once it reconnects to its citizens. Yet to do this it needs to move away
from the current process of simply empowering the Commission to supervise the
implementation of policies that are counter-productive to the European Union’s long-
term interests. The recently launched European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was a first step
in the direction of citizen involvement, for instance, but it is not enough. National
parliaments should be further embedded in the decision-making structure and help make
subsidiarity more than a rhetorical schema. While Eurosceptic voices can often turn ugly
and border on chauvinism, not all of the criticism against EU decision making is paranoid
or condemnable. Such reforms would not only enhance the EU’s legitimacy, they would
also give material substance to Saurugger’s ‘circular Europeanisation’ and integrate the
disparate decision-making levels into a more coherent structure.
Conclusions
The Eurozone crisis is a lasting one that is full of turns and surprises. The latest example
was the Cypriot bailout of March 2013, which opened up a whole new discussion about
the spectrum of possible solutions in dealing with indebted members and about the safety
of individual savings. The aim of this article has been to underline the key policy and
institutional reforms adopted at the EU level as well as their implications for member
states since 2008. It has also highlighted some of the key theoretical repercussions and
lessons from the crisis as they are further developed in the articles of this symposium.
Finally, it has turned to the normative discussion about the future of the EU in light of
the empirical and theoretical findings.
The politics of austerity has been the main avenue promoted by the ‘Euro Summit’ as
a way out of the crisis. A recipe promoted by the German government and supported by
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a number of member states in the absence of a consensus on more viable solutions has
led to fast and often radical policy and administrative changes in the countries receiving
European financial aid. Two observations can be made. The first concerns the EU
institutions and the increase in coercive mechanisms and conditionality in the EU’s
relationship with bailout countries. Never before has the role of an international insti-
tution – namely the IMF – been so pronounced in EU politics. The second observation
concerns changes at the member state level, where following the austerity rationale has
led to a further shrinking of national administrations and of welfare institutions and
provisions. Citizens are finding it difficult to accept this new Europe, especially in regions
where until recently growth and infrastructure development had been linked to EU
structural funds. The financial crisis has been transformed into a social and political crisis,
and extremism is gaining ground.
We argue that the complexity of the crisis has made interdisciplinary research and the
exchange of approaches, data and results across the social sciences indispensable. This
symposium is a first attempt in this direction. For example, politics and economics
approaches shed light on the winners and losers of the wave of public and social policy
reforms in the South of Europe (Jordana; Matsaganis and Leventi). The effect of austerity
policies upon the informal welfare state and thus upon the success of economic stabili-
sation programmes is eloquently demonstrated by Lyberaki and Tinios, building upon the
economics of the family and social networks literature. Finally, Saurugger’s engagement
with the Europeanisation literature demonstrates the importance of deepening our
understanding of changes at the EU level.
To conclude, we would argue that the intensity of the crisis and its theoretical and
empirical implications have increased the need for a normative discussion about the
future of Europe within academia and between disciplines. The EU and its member states
are at a critical juncture and they should either move forward towards a more federal
union or they will be guided to a return to intergovernmentalism. The solutions and the
intermediate steps between the two directions are many and should be further discussed
and explored by politicians, citizens and academics. What needs to be elucidated in the
near future is a coherent vision of a future EU. Further delay in articulating that vision
threatens to undermine the EU project in its entirety.
(Accepted: 28 January 2014)
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